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We analyzed the extent to which a high false alert rate of the conflict alerting (CA) 
system in five ATC facilities was the cause of a “cry-wolf” effect, whereby true alerts of 
a pending loss of separation were associated with either controller failure to respond or a 
delayed response. Radar track data surrounding 497 CA’s were examined and from these 
we extracted information as to whether the alert was true or false, whether a trajectory 
change was (response) or was not (non-response) evident, whether a loss of separation 
occurred, and the controller response time to the CA. Results revealed an overall 47% 
false alert rate, but that increases in this rate across facilities was not associated with 
more non-responses or delayed responses to true alerts, or loss-of-separation. Cry-wolf 
appeared to be absent. Instead, desirable anticipatory behavior indicated that controllers 
often responded prior to the conflict alerts. 
 
 
In June 2006, the National transportation and Safety Board documented a series of accidents - 
controlled flight into terrain, and mid-air collisions - in which the minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) 
and conflict alerts, respectively, announced a pending collision (NTSB, 2006). However, controllers failed to 
respond or intervene to prevent the accident. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from a specific accident (midair 
collision of two Cessna aircraft near San Diego), and from other interviews with controllers (Ahlstrom & 
Pasnjwani, 2003), suggested the prevalence of controller experience of the “cry wolf” effect (Breznitz, 1983). 
The “cry wolf” effect is a general syndrome whereby excessive alarms, many of them seemingly unnecessary 
to the operator (e.g., “false alarms” or “false alerts”), lead to a distrust in the alarm system, and a disregarding 
of (or late response to) some true alarms. 
Linking this well observed phenomenon to the findings of missed alerts in the NTSB study suggests 
that there may be a causal connection between the two. When examining false alerts in predictive collision 
alerting systems, certain features of time-dependence (Kuchar, 2000) make these different from other alerts 
such as cockpit engine warnings (Dixon & Wickens, 2006). In particular, inherent in any dynamic system in a 
noisy environment subject to cross winds, turbulence, and pilot control inputs, is the problem that prediction 
becomes less accurate with increasing look-ahead time. Furthermore, an alert may be “false” for two reasons; 
it may actually predict a loss of separation but extrapolation of the trajectory indicates that an LOS will not 
occur; or it may correctly predict an LOS, but a subsequent trajectory change (in response to a controller 
instruction) is implemented so that no LOS is observed.  Finally, true “misses” are very rare in CA systems; 
but these are more often manifest as delayed alerts. Clearly if the alert is delayed so long that there is little 
time to maneuver the aircraft away from the separation loss, such an event can be seen as equivalent to a miss. 
A general conclusion from research which has examined false alerts, when humans can monitor the 
data in parallel appears to be that, while misses may be catastrophic in a system in which there is no human 
backup to monitor the raw data in parallel, in systems that allow such parallel human-machine monitoring 
(Parasuraman, 1987), false alarm-prone systems may often be worse (Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Dixon, 
Wickens & McCarley, 2007; see Wickens, Levinthal, & Rice, in press, for a summary). This may be 
particularly true in high workload multi-task circumstances since a false-alarm prone system may not only 
cause ignorance of true alerts, but, when such alerts are responded to, this response can be quite disruptive of 
concurrent tasks; either as a result of carrying out the unnecessary alarm-triggered action or of the need to 
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cross check the raw data to establish that the alarm was indeed false. In a further argument for a higher 
threshold, in many predictive alerting systems such as the conflict alerts studied here, a higher threshold does 
not necessarily translate to more missed events, but only to a later alerting of true events (a much less 
catastrophic outcome). Indeed if this alerting look-ahead time still provides adequate time for humans to 
respond, then the benefit of reducing false alarms would more than offset the shorter time period between the 
alert and the occurrence of the forecast event (e.g., the pending collision). 
The purpose of the current study was to seek evidence for the FA-caused cry-wolf phenomenon from 
live or “naturalistic” data across five air traffic control facilities in which controllers responded to mid-air 
conflict alerts (CA’s), and across which the CA false alert rate varied. Such live ATC data have never before 
been examined in this fashion; although it parallels the analysis of weather forecasters (Barnes, et al., 2006), 
pilots (Bliss, 2004), and health care practitioners (Xiao, et al., 2004), responding to imperfect alerting systems. 
In this process we must first examine performance of the CA system itself, to assess a FA rate, and then 
examine the influence of differences in this rate on behavior of the controller, and performance of the 
controller-CA (human-automation) system as a whole. 
In the current research, we addressed the hypothesis that, assuming there to be variability in false 
alert rate across ATC facilities, those with the higher FA rate, would show greater evidence for “cry wolf” 
behavior: later responses, and/or more non-responses. In addition, we examine other aspects of controller 
response to CA’s that are either true or false; in particular considering the properties of the alerting system that 
may lead to a loss of separation, and/or lead to desirable anticipatory behavior. 
 
Methods: CA system analysis 
 
The CA system (FAA, 2003) is designed to predict when two aircraft will close simultaneously, 
within 5 miles laterally and 1000 feet vertically. Figure 1 presents the schematic for the lateral dimension 
only. Such closure is known as a loss of separation (LOS), shown on the left of figure 1. Hence the CA 
predicts any LOS that is forecast to occur within a look-ahead time of 75-135 seconds. When the CA system 
predicts such an LOS, the data tags on the controllers’ display start to flash. The algorithm underlying the CA 
generates a linear extrapolation both on the horizontal (map) plane and the vertical plane, of the current 
heading and vertical speed of both aircraft (FAA, 2003). 
We were provided data from the FAA for 494 conflict alerts, extracted from the busiest 2-hour 
periods from a sample of 2 or 3 days in each of five en-route ATC centers. Such data (distributed across three 
different data bases) included for each CA: (1) properties of the pair of trajectories predicted by the CA (e.g., 
predicted point of closest passage, time of alert), (2) the actual radar tracks & altitude of the aircraft (sampled 
every 10 sec), and (3) a short analysis of the actual conflict as it was played out (See Wickens, Rice, et al., 
2008, for details). The most important element of this third set was a metric (minmax ratio or MMR) 
describing the inverse severity of the conflict. A value of 0 corresponded to an actual collision and a value of 1 
was the threshold for a loss of separation. Higher values indicated passage with greater lateral and vertical 
separation than the minima. Two key variables provided to us for each center were the “busyness” of the 
center (the number of encounters per hour (where “encounter” is the point at which the CA algorithm begins 
to examine track pairs), and the number of CA’s during the equivalent period. Table 1 shows these two 
parameters across the five Centers (row 2 and 3) along with the ratio in row 4 of the total CA’s to the total 
encounters within the center; an estimate of the CA rate. Importantly, Table 1 reveals that what might be 
defined as the “CA-rate” in the bottom row did not vary substantially across Centers, in spite of the 8-fold 
variation in “busyness”. 
 
 
Table 1. Basic data from CA systems. 
ZLC ZHU ZLA ZTL ZID 
1126 1,589 5,529 5679 8,813 
22 36 72 435 124 
22/4525=.005 124/26440=.004 36/4767=.007 235/38815=006 72/16589=.004 
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Figure 1: Geometry of CA system shown when an 
LOS is pending (left column) and not (right), and 
when the alert is triggered (top) or not (bottom). 
Within the triggered alerts, controllers may (dashed 
line) or may not (solid line) initiate a maneuver.  
Figure 2: Example of radar tracks used to classify 
alert as true or false, and to identify controller 
response. A trajectory change (descent of blue) is 
clearly visible in the vertical track at the upper right. 
The lower plot depicts separation on both axes. 
 
 
Results 1: CA system analysis. 
 
For the CA system, we calculated the false alert rate as the proportion of alerts that were categorized as 
“false”. As noted above, we also distinguished between alerts (both true and false) when controllers did and did not 
impose a trajectory change, as such change was inferred from the radar tracks. When a change was implemented, a 
visual analysis was used to extrapolate the pre-change course, to assess if an LOS would have simultaneously 
compromised lateral and vertical minima, had the alteration not taken place. This analysis was carried out on ground 
track data, an example of which is shown in figure 2. The analysis was carried out by two independent observers for 
two of the centers, and by one of these observers for the remaining three. 
We examined the computed FA rate as a function of the CA rate (CA/encounter) across the five centers. 
Two features became evident from this examination. First, there was considerable variance in FA rate, from a low of 
0.28 to a high of 0.58, and on average approximately half of the CA’s were “false”. This allowed us to examine the 
cry wolf effect. Second, there appeared to be no relationship between CA rate and FA rate. A separate analysis also 
revealed that FA rate did not co-vary with overall traffic density.  We also analyzed and categorized the geometry of 
the trajectories of the pairs of aircraft entering into each CA, and of the controller responses (e.g., climb, turn); these 
analyse can be found in Rantanen & Wickens (2009); and Wickens Rice et al (2008). 
 
Results 2: Controller performance Analysis 
 
Categorical analyses. Before examining the influence of FA rate on manifestations of the cry wolf 
phenomenon, it is necessary to identify the overall prevalence of those manifestations in our sample of data. Thus, in 
addition to the dichotomization of true versus false alerts discussed above, - characteristics of the automation - we 
examined two other important dichotomies which are characteristic of the human (controller): the presence or 
absence of a response (as inferred from visual analysis of the track data), and the presence or absence of a loss of 
separation (LOS).  As noted in the previous section, it was usually relatively easy to identify whether a distinct 
change in trajectory was implemented in the time period around a CA (see the descent of the blue aircraft in figure 
2), hence allowing inference of the presence and delay of a controller response. However, for a small sample, this 
classification became quite difficult and so those trials were not included in the data base. 
Our analysis revealed that on roughly 10% of the CA’s there was no evidence for a controller response, at 
least as indicated by a trajectory change by either of the two aircraft involved in the CA. These non-responses were 
statistically more prevalent when the CA was false (18%) than when it was true (1.5% χ2(1, N = 437) = 37.5, p < 
.0001). Such a result might be anticipated to the extent that the trajectories  triggering a false alarm are,  by 
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definition, more likely to yield a more distant “closest passage” or miss distance and hence more likely to be 
considered by the controllers  not to require a trajectory change. 
Our analysis also revealed that the LOS rate is, like the non-response rate, approximately 10% of the data 
base. Also, it appears that the two types of outcomes are unevenly distributed across the two types of alerts. 
Specifically, True alerts are more likely to precede a loss of separation (21%) than are false alerts. (3%; χ2(1, N = 
373) = 20.3, p < .0001) Here too, this is a plausible outcome, given that the true alert will occur on a trajectory pair 
that is more dangerous, and hence slightly more likely to yield the ultimate loss of separation, even with a controller 
intervention. 
We then examined the relationship between controller response and LOS, to establish the extent to which 
non-responses might be associated with a LOS. These observations are collapsed over true vs. false alerts. This 
analysis indicated that when the controller did not respond, this was very unlikely to produce an LOS (5%; and 
those two events were restricted to a single center), whereas such LOS events were somewhat more prevalent when 
the controller did respond (9%) although the difference in proportion was not significant. (χ2(1, N = 380) = .778, p < 
.378). We note here that this finding does not necessarily imply that controller responses were counter-productive, 
since the vast majority of LOS cases occur on true alerts, where there would definitely have been an LOS had the 
controller not intervened with a trajectory change. 
Collectively, the above three analyses provide no evidence for the strongest form of cry wolf effect (non-
response leading to a LOS) and indeed the number (2) of such joint events is even less than what the independent 
product of the two classes of events might predict (10% NR rate X 10% LOS rate = 1% of the CA events = 4). We 
next sought to determine if there was any causal relation between FA rate, as it varied across centers, and either 
non-responses or LOS events. Figure 3 shows the scatter plot of FA vs. non-response, and reveals a striking and 
pronounced trend: the greater the false alarm rate in the center, the less controllers tended to respond (r = 0.944; 
p<.05). However, when the LOS rate was examined as a function of FA rate across Center, there was no trend. This 
null effect suggests that the increase in non-responses in the more FA-prone Center were not associated with a 






















Figure 3: Non response rate as a function of false alert rate. 
 
Response Time. We then examined the second manifestation of the cry wolf phenomenon: the possible 
delay in controller response time associated with more FA’s. Interpreting the delay between  the CA and the 
trajectory change response required consideration of  the total transmission lag (TTL).This is the time for the 
following processes to occur: (1) controller notices a dangerous convergence; (2) controller chooses a trajectory 
change and communicates this to the pilot; (3) pilot confirms and implements the change with flight controls; (4) the 
aircraft initiates a sufficient trajectory change to be evident in the radar track  This TTL is estimated to be 
approximately 20-25 seconds (Allendoerfer & Friedman-Berg, 2007). Our analysis revealed that for about 45% of 
the CA’s, controllers must have initiated the trajectory processing (noticing convergence and choosing a maneuver) 
before the CA occurred because the RT was less than 25 seconds. Indeed when we examined the distribution of 
response times, relative to the CA, we observed a distinct bimodality, with a minimum at around 25 seconds (See 
Wickens, Rice, et al., 2008). This bimodality, coupled with the estimate of a 25 second TTL, supported the notion 
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that there were two categorically different types of responses: which we labeled anticipatory responses and 
reactive responses. 
An ANOVA carried out on the ln-transformed RT data indicated that, for anticipatory responses, there was 
no difference in response time between true and false alerts (p > .10); however for reactive responses, true alerts 
were responded to approximately 73-59=14 seconds more rapidly than false responses (t(193) = 2.4, p < .02), 
reflecting the increased urgency of the former. There was no significant difference in RT between LOS and non-
LOS encounters, so we can reject the hypotheses that the former resulted because of a delay in response time. 
An analysis of three centers’ data did reveal a main effect of center, F(2, 154) = 6.78, p < 0.01, with the 
highest density center (ZID) showing faster responses (30 s) than either the low (33 s) or mid (36 s) density Centers, 
an effect  observed for both anticipatory and reactive responses. This effect is noteworthy because, whereas 
increasing density might have been anticipated to slow RT because of greater workload, the faster RT for ZID was 
observed despite its greater traffic density (See Table 1). Finally, within  the non-LOS encounters (MMR > 1.0), we 
correlated RT with the value of MMR to test if later responses were responded with closer (but still above minima) 
passages. This correlation, examined for the three mid-level Centers was non significant (p > 0.10), suggesting that 
controllers did not compromise safety when their responses were delayed. 
 Finally, we examined the frequency of anticipatory vs. reactive responses for true vs. false alarms. 
Analyses of these data reveals that controllers were significantly more likely to anticipate on a true (0.58) than a 
false (0.37) alert  (χ2(1, N = 374) = 5.08, p = .024). This is a plausible finding because the true alert trajectories 




The current data provide little or no evidence that the FA-induced cry wolf effect exists for the en-route CA 
system, as it is operationally defined by non-response to true alerts, and by later responses to all alerts. More 
particularly, false alerts do not appear to be responsible for safety-compromise in the ATC centers whose data were 
sampled. The generality and robustness of this conclusion is supported both by the wide range of center busyness, as 
well as the large sample size of the data, which provides for powerful statistical conclusions. (That is, the null 
hypothesis was not accepted simply because of a small N). 
Of course ours was not a true experiment with control exerted across all other aspects of the centers. As in 
any correlational study, confounding variables could have contributed to our results. One such potentially 
confounding variable is that traffic-induced workload differences between centers could have accounted for effects. 
Indeed while this is possible, two factors mitigate concern for this confounding interpretation of the result. First, the 
busiest center (ZID) was only in the middle of the range in terms of both false alerts and non-responses (Figure 3). If 
we assume busyness is a proxy for workload, then this result would not have been obtained had workload been a 
responsible factor. Second, the possible confound with workload would have been more problematic had we found 
that a higher FA rate was associated with more non-responses to true alerts, and/or late responses. In that case we 
would need to reason as to why workload was not responsible for the effect. But as noted, neither of these 
associations were observed. 
In terms of why FA-induced cry wolf behavior did not appear to be observed here, we note that, while 
false, most of the alerts in the CA system were not wildly off the mark, and thereby signaled a system whose 
threshold was set just a little lower than it needed to be, in the conservative interests of preserving safety and 
avoiding misses or late alerts. Recently Lees and Lee (2007) have found that such alerts can actually be beneficial to 
performance, in confirming that the system is generally functioning well. In the current case, for the large number of 
anticipatory responses, one can think of the alerting systems reinforcing the conflict predictions (and trajectory 
alterations) that the controllers actually made in advance of the alerting system warning. 
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